Characteristics models have been found to be useful in many areas of economics. However, their empirical implementation tends to rely heavily on functional form assumptions. In this paper we develop a revealed preference approach to characteristics models. We derive the necessary and su¢ cient empirical conditions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous, price-taking consumers are nonparametrically consistent with the consumer characteristics model. Where these conditions hold, we show how information may be recovered on individual consumer's marginal valuations of product attributes. In some cases marginal valuations are point identi…ed and in other cases we can only recover bounds. Where the conditions fail we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes can play in rationalising the data. We implement these ideas using consumer panel data on the Danish milk market.
Introduction
The idea that consumers have preferences over the characteristics of market goods, as developed by Gorman (1956) , Lancaster (1966) , Muellbauer (1974) and Rosen (1974) , has turned out to be an extremely fruitful one. For example, it is central to much applied microeconomic work on price indices (for example, Stone (1956) as an early example), quality change (Griliches (1971) ), location decisions (Tinbergen (1959) ), labour market allocation (Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) ), …nance (Markowitz (1959) ) and the analysis of markets for di¤erentiated products (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) ). However, the empirical implementation of characteristics models tends to rely heavily on functional form assumptions. In this paper we develop a revealed preference 1 (nonparametric) approach to the empirical analysis of characteristics models. We derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous and price-taking consumers are nonparametrically consistent with the consumer characteristics model. Where the conditions fail we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes can play in rationalising the data. Where these conditions hold, we show how information may be recovered on individual consumer's marginal valuations of product attributes. In some cases marginal valuations are point identi…ed and in other cases we can only recover bounds.
We apply the revealed preference techniques we develop to consumer panel data on the Danish milk market. The two major characteristics that vary across di¤erent types of milk are fat content and whether it is produced under 'organic' conditions. Both aspects are important for substantive issues. Given the concern over increasing obesity in all high income countries there is interest in identifying the marginal valuation of fat and how this is distributed across the population. Our techniques allow us to identify the distribution of these valuations. As regards the second characteristic, 'organic', interest here centres on how much extra consumers are willing to pay for milk that is arguably more healthy (for example, because cows that produce organic milk are never treated with antibiotics) and increases animal welfare. Given that organic milk is more expensive to produce it is important to establish the demand so that farmers or milk marketing boards can assess the demand for organic milk. In this analysis we use data which allows us to follow individual households over very long periods so that we can deal with heterogeneity in a fully nonparametric way by treating each household as an individual time series. We …nd that the demand paths of a majority of households can be rationalised by a linear characteristics model de…ned over three attributes. We show that the distribution of preferences over characteristics is multi-modal, suggesting the existence of distinct types of consumers.
2 Revealed preference conditions for the characteristics model
The Afriat-Varian conditions.
We …rst present the usual revealed preference (RP) conditions for the standard model in which agents have 'direct'preferences over market goods. Let q t be a (K 1) vector of quantities of market goods bought in period t at market prices p t . Given a data set fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T , we ask when these data be rationalised by a utility function, in the following sense:
De…nition 1 A utility function u (q) q-rationalises the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T if u (q t ) u (q) for all q such that p 0 t q t p 0 t q.
The standard results (see Varian (1982) for the de…nition of GARP) are the classic Afriat-Varian conditions:
Afriat' s Theorem 2 . The following statements are equivalent: 1. there exists a utility function u (q) which is continuous, non-satiated and concave which q-rationalises the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T . 2. there exist numbers fU t ; t > 0g t=1;:::;T such that U s U t + t p 0 t (q s q t ) 8 s; t = 1; :::; T 3. the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T satisfy the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
These conditions have been applied to aggregate time series data (see, for example, Varian (1982) ) and (less frequently) to household data (see Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003) ).
RP conditions for the characteristics model.
The characteristics model posits that rather than having preferences over market goods directly, agents have preferences over the characteristics or attributes that these goods embody. The transformation from a K-vector of market goods, q, to a J-vector of characteristics, z, is given by the mapping z = F (q). Preferences are then de…ned over characteristics v (z). This gives a derived utility function over market goods u (q) = v (F (q)). The consumer choice model for given prices p and outlay x is:
This model takes prices as given for individual agents and we follow this treatment in this paper. Thus we adopt the Muellbauer (1974) and Gorman (1954) tradition of focusing on the demand side, and abstract from any supply side simultaneity issues (Rosen (1974) ). The most widely analysed and applied version of the consumer characteristics model is one in which characteristics are a linear function of the demands for market goods. That is z = A 0 q where A is 2 Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1973) , Varian (1982) .
(K J) matrix of constants with J K and A has full column rank. The technology matrix A records the amounts of each of the characteristics present in one unit of each of the market goods. In this paper we concentrate on this linear version of model but note that most of what follows also applies to non-linear characteristics with concave technologies. Our initial focus is on the circumstances under which data can be nonparametrically rationalised by this model. In this context the term rationalise is de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 A utility function v (z) z-rationalises the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T for the technology
This states that a utility function rationalises observed choices if it assigns an equal or higher value to those bundles of characteristics which the consumer chooses, than it does to those alternative bundles of characteristics which could have feasibly been produced from a¤ordable bundles of market goods. If a utility function z-rationalises the data, this means that were it plugged into the consumer's maximisation problem set out above, then it would perfectly generate the observed data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T for the posited technology A.
For a good, k, which is purchased, the …rst order condition from the linear characteristics model gives the following characterisation of its price as a weighted sum of the shadow prices of its characteristics:
where a k denotes the kth row of A and:
Thus the shadow price of a characteristic is de…ned as its marginal utility normalised by the marginal utility of total expenditure ( t ) (see Gorman (1956) , equation (5)). That the market price of a good that is bought can be viewed as a linear combination of the underlying shadow prices is the most important feature of characteristics models. If good k is not bought then we have the inequality: p k t a k t (2) so that the market price is too high relative to the subjective valuation of the embodied attributes. The key to deriving necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the characteristics model can be shown in a simple …gure. In Figure 1 we present a graphical three good, two attribute illustration of the revealed preference conditions. Initially the agent faces the constraints given by the kite shape de…ned by solid lines and chooses point A at which she is consuming goods 1 and 2. Suppose now that the price of good 1 falls and the price of good 3 rises, so that she now faces the dotted constraint set. If she now switches to buying some of good 3 and none of good 1 then we cannot rationalise her choices with convex preferences. If, on the other hand, she continues to buy both of goods 1 and 2, or even only one of them, we can …nd indi¤erence curves that rationalise the choices. Our task in now to extend this insight into feasible testable conditions for several goods and (P ) there exists a utility function v (z) which is non-satiated, continuous and concave in characteristics which z-rationalises the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T for given A. (A) there exist numbers fV t ; t > 0g t=1;:::;T and vectors f t g t=1;::;T such that
(L) there exist numbers fW t ; t 1; g t=1;:::;T and vectors f t g t=1;::;T such that
(G) the data f t ; A 0 q t g t=1;:::;T pass GARP for some choice of t such that (A2) and (A3) are satis…ed.
Conditions A2 and A3 impose the linear pricing condition (1) . Conditions (A) and (G) are the characteristics model analogues of the conditions in Afriat's Theorem. However, both present practical di¢ culties for testing. Condition (G) requires that we …rst …nd the shadow prices in order to implement a GARP test and there is no known general algorithm to do this in a …nite number of steps 4 . Condition (A) involves both non-linear functions of unknowns (the t 0 t terms) and strict inequality constraints on unknowns ( t > 0). We have therefore included condition (L) since this condition is in the form of the restrictions in a linear programming problem. Consequently we can simply employ standard linear programming techniques to …nd, in a …nite number of steps, whether there exists a feasible set of unknowns which satisfy these constraints (the …rst step of all linear programming algorithms). Nevertheless, whilst this approach will always give a result in a …nite number of steps, for even moderate sized problems this quickly leads to a large dimension problem since we have T (J + 2) unknowns, T (T 1) + T (K + J) inequality constraints and T K equality constraints. Given this, it is convenient to derive a simple necessary condition for z -rationalisation; this will also be useful in the next subsections.
A necessary condition for z-rationalisation.
Denote the sub-vector of period t prices for which demands are positive as p + t ; and let A + t be corresponding sub-matrix of A (with p 0 t and A 0 t denoting the complementary sub-vectors and sub-matrices for goods for which demands are zero) 5 . Any set of shadow price vectors that satisfy A2 and A3 must have:
A necessary condition 6 for this system of equations to have a solution is that:
where the s symbol denotes horizontal concantenation. of the matrix A + t with the extra column p + t . If this rank condition holds then a solution for the shadow prices will be given by:
1 denotes the generalised (Moore-Penrose) inverse of the not-necessarily-square matrix X. These rank conditions are very easy to check and if they fail for some t then we know that the data can never satisfy A2 and A3. Note, however, that these conditions are only necessary 7 and even if they hold we may not be able to …nd shadow prices that satisfy:
The rank conditions are particularly useful if rank A + t = J since then we can solve uniquely for the shadow price vectors. If this holds in every period, then 4 The computational problem is akin to that encountered in revealed preference tests of weak functional separability (see Varian (1983) ). See below for a discussion of the particular circumstances under which the t vectors may be recovered uniquely. 5 The t subscript on A + t and A 0 t re ‡ects the fact the pattern of goods purchased can vary from period to period. 6 See for example, Magnus and Neudecker, (1991), pp.36-37, Theorem 11. 7 Another necessary, but not su¢ cient condition is that the data fpt; qtg t=1;:::;T satis…es GARP. The conditions in Theorem 1 imply this, but are not implied by it. See Corollary 1 below. 6 we can use GARP and condition (G) for testing which is computationally very rapid. Finally we note that since the characteristics model with J < K is just a special case of the standard model z-rationalisation implies q-rationalisation. Formally:
Corollary 1 If there exists a concave utility function v (z) with z = A 0 q which z-rationalises the data then there exists a concave utility function u (q) which q-rationalises the data.
To summarise, Theorem 1 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for zrationalisation which are computationally feasible and indeed straightforward to check. If a given data set and technology matrix satis…es these conditions then there exists at least one utility function, de…ned over characteristics, which when plugged into the consumer's optimisation problem will generate the observed data without error.
Missing prices.
Thus far we have assumed that the researcher always observes the price of all goods, even of those goods that the consumer does not buy in a particular period. For some data structures this is not the case and we only observe prices the agent faced (or can construct unit values) for goods that are bought. One possible procedure is to impute the missing prices, perhaps by taking the prices paid by other consumers in the same region and period. Another is to use suitable published price indices. The problem with any such imputation is that we can never know how much the outcome of the test depends on the imputation. An alternative procedure is to include the missing prices as unknowns and search for values so that the constructed data satisfy the conditions. Since we can always implicitly set the prices of the goods which are not bought very high, this obviously makes it easier to satisfy the conditions and so the resulting test will be weaker in this sense.
We adopt the same notation as the last subsection with p + t for the prices of the goods bought in period t; p 0 t for the prices not observed in period t (since these goods were not bought) and p t = p Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent: (P ) there exists a utility function v (z) which is non-satiated, continuous and concave in characteristics and there exist prices p 0 t t=1;:::;T which z-rationalise the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T for given A. (A) there exist numbers fV t ; t > 0g t=1;:::;T and vectors f t g t=1;::;T such that
These conditions are identical to, for example, those in conditions (A) and (L) in Theorem 1, except that they do not involve the unobserved prices. Once again we give the standard version of the condition and the linear programming form which is relatively easy to check. The test given in this theorem is weaker than the tests given in the Theorem 1 in the sense that passing the test on data in which all prices are observed (even if some quantities are zero) implies the conditions in this theorem, but not the other way around. If these conditions hold then we can take any set of implied t 's and t 's and simply set:
(which satis…es (L3) in Theorem 1). In this case the resulting p 0 t vectors have the interpretation of being virtual market prices; that is, at these prices consumers are just on the verge of buying market goods that they did not buy in period t. If the t 's and the t are not unique, these values will not be uniquely determined either. Note that we also have the corollary (paralleling Corollary 1) that if there exists a data consistent utility function de…ned over characteristics and virtual prices, then there also exists a data consistent utility function over market goods.
Corollary 2
If there exists a concave utility function v (z) with z = A 0 q and virtual prices p 0 t t=1;:::;T which z-rationalise the data p + t ; q t t=1;:::;T then there also exists a concave utility function u (q) and virtual prices p 0 t t=1;:::;T which q-rationalise the data.
To conclude this section we note that in the presence of missing prices the linear programming condition seems to have a clear advantage over the GARP condition. Firstly they still require the necessary condition rank A Varian (1988) ) GARP-type tests are generally ruled out by missing price data because inner products such as p 0 t q s can involve missing prices; for example, if the price of the kth good is not observed in period t because it wasn't purchased, but good k was purchased in period s. However, the framework described in Theorem 2 can be easily adapted to testing for q-rationalisation when there are missing prices by simply replacing A with the identity matrix I K . This then provides a weaker test of GARP/q-rationalisation in the presence of missing price data in the same sense that Theorem 2 provides a weaker test of the characteristics model than is given in Theorem 1.
3 Latent characteristics.
All goods bought.
In all of the above we have assumed that we observe all of the characteristics of any good that is bought. In practice this is often not the case. The leading example is when goods di¤er in 'quality'and this is not recorded, even though it might be re ‡ected in the market price. Suppose we have some data in which all goods are bought in each period and all prices are observed. Suppose that the data satis…es the q-rationalisation conditions but not the z -rationalisation conditions for a given A. One possible reaction is to seek an alternative A matrix 8 which has rank less than K and does z -rationalise the data. 8 . If, however, we really do believe that the characteristics given by A are objects of preferences (but not the full set) then a more natural procedure is to seek a supplementary set of unobserved characteristics that do z -rationalise the data in conjunction with the observed ones. Given a K H matrix B, denote this augmented technology matrix by the K (J +
This is just a special case of Theorem 1 in which (A2) holds with equality (since all goods are bought). Given data which satis…es the q-rationalisation conditions the issue is then one of …nding suitable supplementary characteristics so that the rank condition holds.
Theorem 3 If the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T satisfy the conditions for q-rationalisation, but not the conditions for z-rationalisation given A; then we can always …nd an augmented matrix e A = A s B so that the data do z-rationalise given the augmented matrix e A where B has rank greater than or equal to H rank(A s P) rank(A).
The matrix A s P has J +T columns. If we have a large number of time periods relative to the number of market goods (T K) then we shall generally have rank(A s P) = K so that the number of latent characteristics, H, is equal to the number of goods minus the number of observed characteristics (K J). In this case any K H matrix B that is orthogonal to A will serve to z -rationalise the data with A s B. One way of …nding B is to regress P on A:
Then take the estimated residual matrixÊ and …nd a K H matrix B that forms a column basis for E, which we can do using, for example, principal components. Two other special cases of an augmented characteristics matrix, where B is not restricted to be K H, have been used in the literature. The …rst option is to add a set of product-speci…c dummy characteristics to the existing set of characteristics as discussed in Gorman (1956) and Pudney (1981) . This approach sets B I K and B E. Thus:
where e t and e t represent column t of e and E etc.). Obviously this augmented model achieves the required rank condition by greatly expanding the number of characteristics to J + K. Thus Gorman suggests that the new characteristics should be made 'small'. The second representation of essentially the same model is to add a single time-varying unobserved characteristic to the A matrix; this is widely used in the empirical IO literature 9 . This approach sets B E and B I T . Thus:
Alternatively, we can think of this as a time varying technology where Obviously the informational content of these three approaches is identical, and only di¤er in the way E is partitioned into additional characteristics and their marginal valuations. Note that E itself is not identi…ed by anything other than the initial method of choosing . In the …rst we want to add as few extra characteristics as possible so we make B a column basis for E. Obviously B is not unique. The second introduces K market-good-speci…c dummy characteristics with corresponding marginal valuations given by E. The third introduces a new time-varying characteristic which has a marginal valuation of unity in every period. The last two suggestions discussed above yield essentially 'trivial' characteristics models in the sense that they have at least as many characteristics as market goods. Only in the …rst may we be able to …nd a non-trivial characteristics model with fewer characteristics than goods would …t the data (i.e. where J + H < K). So far we have assumed that the prices of all goods are observed, even the prices of goods which are not purchased. We now relax this assumption.
Zeros in some periods.
The simplest extension is ask whether there is any vector b that we can concatenate to A such that we can z-rationalise the data for e A = A s b. This is equivalent to searching for one unobserved characterisitic. A natural interpretation of this additional latent attribute is that it represents 'quality'. More generally, we could search for a (K H) matrix B such that we can z-rationalise the data for e A = A s B. As before, to give a non-trivial model we require J + H < K. Conceptually this is straightforward: we simply replace A with e A = A s B in Theorem 2 and add B to the list of unknowns. Unfortunately the resulting problem no longer has a set of constraints that is linear in the unknowns so we cannot use standard linear programming techniques to ensure the existence or non-existence of such a set of parameters. Instead we have to 9 For example Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, (1995). use a nonlinear optimisation approach. To provide the constraint we use the maximum Afriat E¢ ciency 10 function, emax (:), which maps from the observed data to [0; 1]. This is the value such the revealed preference conditions, allowing for some ine¢ ciency in buying, satisfy GARP; a value of 1 means that the data passes GARP and all data passes GARP for a value of zero. The following problem will have a solution at zero if there exists a matrix B which satis…es z-rationalisation This algorithm is straightforward to implement using standard nonlinear optimisation methods. It starts with an initial guess at B, computes ( ; Z) as described and then computes the Afriat e¢ ciency parameter at which the data ( ; Z) pass GARP. If emax ( ; Z) < 1 then f (B) > 0 and B is then altered on the basis of numerically computed gradients with respect to the objective function in order to minimise f (B). We have the following result.
Theorem 4
If Problem 1 has a solution at f (B) = 0 then there exists at least one suitable B matrix such that the data fp t ; q t g and the augmented technology matrix e A = A s B satisfy z-rationalisation.
Finally we consider the case in which no characteristics are observed at all. This is equivalent to having an unknown transformation matrix A. In such a case we may wish to test whether there is any linear characteristics model with a given rank J < K that could be z -rationalisable with some given data. The approach laid out in Problem 1 and Theorem 4 still applies -suitably adapted with e A = B for example. Note, however, that even for medium sized data sets this a 'large'nonlinear problem which can take signi…cant time.
Application

The data
In this section we apply some of the ideas outlined above to data on purchases of (cow's) milk in a Danish consumer panel. The data cover 2; 500 households during 1999 and 2000; these households comprise all types ranging from young singles to couples with children to elderly couples. The sample is representative of the Danish population (the round number of 2; 500 households is a coincidence). Over the two years, each household keeps a strict record of everything they buy in each shopping trip; this is done by the use of home scanners which record price, quantity, the characteristics of the good, the store used etc.. We aggregate the milk records to a monthly level, partly to minimise the computational burden and partly to allow us to treat milk as a non-durable, non-storable good, so that the intertemporally separable model which we are testing is appropriate. Thus for each month we have the quantity and expenditure for each type of milk; from this we construct a unit value for any milk bought as the monthly expenditure divided by the monthly quantity. Since we cannot construct a unit value for a type that is not bought we are in the missing price context discussed in subsection 2:4.
We concentrate on the 6 main types of milk which di¤er according to fat content (0:1% (skimmed), 1:5% (semi-skimmed) and 3:5% (full-fat)) and conventional/organic production methods 11 . Organic milk is produced under strictly supervised conditions that are meant to better for the cows and to produce more healthy milk (for example, antibiotics cannot be used for 'organic'herds). Table  1 below shows the market shares by value and volume of these six types in our data. Overall conventional milk commanded the majority of the market with a share of about 75% on both measures, and semi-skimmed milk is the most popular type by fat content with nearly 60% of the market by both measures. This is mainly due to the pattern of conventional milk sales; within the organic segment of the market, skimmed and semi-skimmed have equal shares. We treat preferences over milk characteristics as being a separable group from all other characteristics. This is a questionable assumption since the fat that is contained in milk is also to be found in other products such as butter and cheese. If we drop separability then we are left with an impossibly wide problem (hundreds of goods and dozens of characteristics); in this respect it would be highly desirable to extend revealed preference tests to latent separability (see Crawford (2004) and Blundell and Robin (2000) ). The corresponding characteristics model has K = 6 market goods, and J = 3 characteristics: Table 3 . Market goods and characteristics
Market goods
Characteristics Conventional milk, 3.5% fat "Milkiness" Conventional milk, 1.5% fat Fat content Conventional milk, 0.1% fat "Organic" Organic milk, 3.5% fat Organic milk, 1.5% fat Organic milk, 0.1% fat
The transformation matrix is given by:
The …rst characteristic is is the baseline characteristic common to all milkwe have termed it "milkiness" (the combination of water, calcium, particular vitamins etc. that are common to all milks) -and it is measured in litres. If a consumer were to buy one litre of completely fat free, conventionally produced milk (were such a product available in this market) this is the characteristic they would consume. Fat content is measured in centilitres per liter and is linear with respect to market goods: a litre of skimmed and a litre of semiskimmed together produce 1:6 cl's of fat by volume 12 . The interpretation of the organic/conventional characteristic is less straightforward. It is measured by an indicator taking the value 1 if the milk is produced under organic conditions, and 0 otherwise. Whatever the organic characteristic represents (perhaps a warm glow, perhaps the absence of antibiotic residues in the milk) this speci…cation of the technology says that twice as much of it is produced by buying 2 litres of milk, than is produced by 1 litre; which is not to say, however, that the consumer then values it twice as much since the utility function is concave in attributes.
Results
Missing prices.
In these data we can only construct unit prices for the purchases which take place. As already discussed, the two options to deal with this are either to impute prices and apply the test described in Theorem 1 or to apply the weaker test in Theorem 2 which only requires the observed prices. We present the results for both tests beginning with the weaker test (since if a household fails this then they obviously cannot satisfy Theorem 1 however we were to impute the missing prices). For households satisfying the conditions we present the marginal valuations of characteristics we are able to recover using our methods. We then impute the missing prices using region/month cell medians from observed unit prices and re-test applying the conditions in Theorem 1. Note that in carrying out these test we consider each household separately so that we allow for complete heterogeneity amongst households. This is with respect to whether or not an individual household's behaviour is z-rationalisable at all; the form of their preferences if they indeed are rationalisable and their marginal valuations of the characteristics.
To begin with we take the time series of price and quantity data for an individual household and the 3-factor technology matrix and apply phase one of the linear programme de…ned by condition (L) in Theorem 2. We record whether a feasible solution exists. We then take the data for the next household and repeat the exercise. We also apply the test of q-rationalisation in which we replace A with an I K matrix. The results are given in Table 4 . We …nd that for the great majority of the sample households there exist suitable virtual prices and utility functions which q-rationalise their observed behaviour. We also …nd that for three-quarters of the sample (and 81% of those who are q-rationalisable) behaviour is also z -rationalisable. We also investigate whether we can explain the pattern of passing/failure using some of the observable characteristics of the survey households. The controls were: dummy variables for single person households, households composed of couples, the presence of children, the presence of pre-school age children, the main shopper being male, the presence of retired people and living in Copenhagen and continuous variables for the total volume of milk purchased by the household and the mean age of the adults in the household. In a linear regression of a q-rationalisability indicator on these variables and a constant, only the male shopper dummy was signi…cant (positively). For the same regression for z-rationalisability the dummies for single person households, retired household members and the purchase volume were all positively signi…cant. The pre-school children dummy was negatively signi…cant. However, the overall ability of these control variables to …t the patterns of passes and failure in the data was very weak. The R 2 of linear regressions of q-rationalisability and z-rationalisability indicators on these controls were 0:0075 and 0:032 respectively. We conclude that the patterns of passes/failures is largely unexplained by observables. The linear programme test only indicates the existence of Afriat numbers and vectors of marginal valuations of characteristics which satisfy the conditions for the model; it does not recover them uniquely. However, for many households which are rationalisable we are able to recover unique solutions for the -vectors. For these households (1385 in all) we solve for t in each period where a solution can be obtained 13 . Table 6 reports some descriptive statistics for the marginal valuations of each characteristic, and Figure 2 illustrates their sample densities. It is most important to note that these are no longer representative of the population since they are highly selected. For example, a household that only ever buys one type of milk will not have a unique shadow prices and consequently is not represented in these samples. To fully characterise the joint distributions of tastes would require partial identi…cation methods and would produce bounds rather than point estimates. 1 3 Note that we may not be able to solve for all of the elements of t in every case as this will depend on the standard rank/order requirements for the simultaneous equation systems p
recovered are negative and nearly 17% of organic are negative. These negative marginal valuations do not con ‡ict with the theory and are not inconsistent with the idea that the consumption of market goods has non-negative marginal utility overall. For some households which buy a su¢ ciently wide range of goods we are able simultaneously to recover their valuations of all of the characteristics. Two dimensions (fat,organic) are illustrated in Figure 3 ; note that once again a household may appear several times in this distribution. There appear to be three distinct modes: one small group (top left) shows a high fat valuation and a low valuation for organic; a larger group (top right) has a high valuation of organic and a moderate one for fat; a large middle group which values organic but not fat. It seems that households are fairly stable with respect to which of these groups they principally belong with 77% of households appearing in only one of these groups, 20% appearing in two groups (most often the big low fat-moderate organic and the top right moderate fat-moderate organic groups) and only 3% of households having valuations which appear in all three.
Imputed prices.
We now impute the missing prices using the medians of region/time period cells and test for q-rationalisation and z-rationalisation using Theorem 1. With the missing data …lled in in this manner, we …rst test (using Afriat's Theorem) for q-rationalisation for each individual household to see whether there exists an admissible utility function u (q) de…ned over products which rationalises their behaviour. For those that fail we know that z-rationalisation is out of the question. For those where a suitable u (q) exists we apply the conditions in Theorem 1. Using the imputed prices, 71% of the sample are q-rationalisable: the rest are not and since (taking the imputed prices to be correct) q-rationalisation is a necessary condition for z-rationalisation, these households cannot satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1. Setting them aside we then test the remaining 1766 households. We …nd that, using the imputed prices, 60% of the sample are zrationalisable (this represents 84% of those who satisfy the prerequisite of being q-rationalisable). As before, we examined the ability of observable household characteristics to predict the pattern of passes/failures in the data. Once more, though individual controls were statistically signi…cant 14 the overall R 2 for qrationalisability and z-rationalisability were extremely low: 0:0402 and 0:0325 respectively. Once more we conclude that the pattern of passes/failures is essentially random with respect to household observables.
Conclusions
We have extended revealed preference methods to the analysis of consumer characteristics models. We have derived the necessary and su¢ cient empirical conditions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous, price-taking, individual consumers are nonparametrically consistent with the consumer characteristics model. We consider the case in which all prices are observed and the case in which only the price of the purchased goods are observed. Where these conditions hold, we show how information may be recovered on individual consumer's marginal valuations of product attributes. Where the conditions fail we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes can play in rationalising the data. We have implemented these ideas using a consumer panel data on the Danish milk market. Speci…cally we consider the purchase of six milk types using a long household panel. We …nd that most households who satisfy the conventional Afriat-Varian consistency conditions also satisfy those for a simple three characteristics model. We supply estimates of the distribution of tastes for the three characteristics.
6 Appendix.
Proof of Corollary 1
If there exists a function v (z) that z-rationalises fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T , then v (A 0 q t ) v (A 0 q) for all q such that p Hence v (A 0 q t ) + (1 )v (A 0 q s ) u ( q t + (1 )q s ) =) u (q) is concave.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Obvious from comparison with Theorem 1 whilst noting that given t such that p 
Proof of Corollary 2.
Analogous to Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.
By Afriat's Theorem GARP for the data fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T is equivalent to the existence of numbers fV t ; t > 0g t=1;:::;T such that V s V t + t p 0 t (q s q t ) for all s; t = 1; :::; T The rank condition implies the existence of vectors f t g t=1;:::;T such that Then rank fEg = rank(A s P) rank(A ) rank(A s P) rank(A) = H. Assume is chosen so that rank fEg = H. Thus E can be written as B B where B is a K H matrix that forms a column basis for E and B = BB o where e A is the augmented A matrix. Given this rank condition and the fact that fp t ; q t g t=1;:::;T is q-rationalisable Corollary 1 then applies. Since rank fEg can never be less than H, B must always add at least H characteristics to the model.
Proof of Theorem 4
If f (B) = 0 then emax( ; Z) = 1 since emax( ; Z) 2 [0; 1] and by de…nition (see the discussion of this function in the Appendix) the data f t ; z t g t=1;:::;T satisfy condition (G) and therefore conditions (A) and (L) in Theorem 1 and their equivalents in Theorem 2.
The Afriat e¢ ciency function.
A GARP test can be interpreted as a test of two sub-hypotheses: (1) the consumer has rational preferences, and (2) the consumer is an e¢ cient programmer. If the data violates GARP then Afriat (1973) suggests modifying (2) whilst maintaining (1) . He suggests a form of partial e¢ ciency, and introduces the e¢ ciency parameter e where 0 e 1. The consumer is now allowed to waste a fraction (1 e) of their budget through optimisation error. This is done by modifying the preference relation R 0 to: e . If e = 1 then GARP (e) is equivalent to GARP . If e = 0 then there is no restriction on behaviour. The function e () is a simple numerical search algorithm with …nds the largest value of e such that a given data set satis…es GARP (e).
